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INTRODUCTION

Freedom of speech, like democracy, has its problems. On balance, we embrace freedom of speech because the alternatives are
worse. In embracing free speech, we trust ourselves to hear and
evaluate the speech of racists, Klansmen, Communists, Nazis,
Republicans, and Democrats.' In so doing, we do not accept all
that is spoken or propagated. Indeed, much speech that we allow
advocates values that are evil and repugnant. Because censorship
is more dangerous than the alternatives, we permit that which we
Copyright D 1986 by Michael Kent Curtis.
* B.A., University of the South, 1964; J.D., University of North Carolina,
1969. Partner in the firm of Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James & Harkavy.
Mr. Curtis has represented clients in a number of first amendment cases-ranging
from a preacher arrested for reading from the Bible in downtown Greensboro to
defendants charged with violation of state obscenity laws. He currently represents
defendants charged under the new obscenity statute. Mr. Curtis would like to
thank Davison M. Douglas for his assistance in preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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abhor. Yet we follow a different
approach where sexually explicit
2
books and films are involved.
To say all of this is not to negate concern with values. Values
of equality, democracy, fidelity, commitment, love and tenderness
are basic. Whether censorship is the way to promote these values
(and at what cost to other values) is a much more difficult
question.
In October 1985, North Carolina made it a felony punishable
by three years in prison to disseminate obscene materials.' Possession of the same materials may be another three-year felony. 4 The
materials potentially subject to sanction include those that show or
describe actual or simulated sexual activities or exhibit the genitals
in a "lewd" way.'
The new statute raises again the question of the extent to
which it is proper for the state to use the criminal sanction to prohibit expression that the legislature finds, or at least thinks its constituents find, abhorrent.
It is clearly permissible to employ the criminal sanction to
prohibit the dissemination of sexually explicit expression to the extent that identifiable rights of third parties are directly infringed
by material that can be clearly defined. Censoring a book because
it allegedly causes crime raises more serious problems. Works of
great literature and news reports may have such an effect on some
people. Still, adults should not be reduced to reading only what is
fit for the unbalanced.
2. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
4. Id. at § 14-190.1(e). Prior to October 1985, the statute prohibited the intentional dissemination of obscenity "in any public place." The 1985 statute eliminated the requirement that the dissemination be in a public place, thereby raising the inference that dissemination in a private place-the home-would violate
the statute.
5. The sexual conduct which is proscribed by the statute is set out in subsection (c):
(1) Vaginal, anal, or oral intercourse, whether actual or simulated,
normal or perverted; or
(2) Masturbation, excretory functions, or lewd exhibition of uncovered genitals; or
(3) An act or condition that depicts torture, physical restraint by
being fettered or bound or flagellation of or by a nude person or a person
clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume.
Id. at § 14-190.1(c).
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Some types of regulation are justified. Dissemination of child
pornography, carefully defined, should be prohibited in the interest of protecting children-including protecting their rights to privacy.' Moreover, zoning may be an appropriate response to certain
types of "adult" establishments. Protection of minors and unwilling viewers, though not simple, justifies regulation.7
Absent such circumstances, imposition of the criminal sanction is fraught with danger and should be pursued, if at all, only as
to very narrow categories of sexually explicit expression. The
North Carolina statute, which embraces all the censorship the Justices find permissible, takes the opposite approach. Under the statute, individuals are subject to prosecution without fair notice of
the line between what is permitted and what is forbidden. Consequently the statute inhibits protected expression in a manner that
is unacceptable in a democratic society. For the natural effect of
vague prohibitions aimed at prohibited expression and reinforced
by harsh punishment is a dramatic restriction of protected
expression.
The first portion of this article examines obscenity regulation
both in the federal arena and in North Carolina and looks briefly
at how we got to where we are today. The second part examines
the current North Carolina statute and the constitutional problems
which are inextricably connected with it. The final section considers directions that the courts (or legislature) should take in consideration of the new North Carolina statute.

II. A
A.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Developments in the Federal Arena

Obscenity, as most Justices of the Supreme Court tell us, is
not protected by the first amendment.8 From this point of clarity
6. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (allowing suppression of child
pornography).
7. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state may prohibit distribution of certain material to minors which may not be barred for adults); Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (dictum) (proper for state to prevent dissemination of obscene material to minors without prohibiting dissemination to other persons); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 n.13 (1975) (a "narrowly drawn nondiscriminatory traffic regulation requiring screening of drive-in
theatres from public view" would be permissible); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning ordinance limiting the places
where movie theatres showing "adult" films may be located).
8. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
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the law of obscenity quickly fades into murk. For sex and obscenity, the Justices have said, are not synonymous.
[S]ex and obscenity are not synonymous. . . . The portrayal of
sex, e.g., in art, literature, and scientific works, is not sufficient
reason to deny the material the Constitutional protection of
speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in
human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest
to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of
human interest and public concern.'
The problem then is to distinguish obscene from non-obscene
portrayals of sexual conduct. Yet making these distinctions has
proved enormously difficult.
Justice Potter Stewart once suggested that obscenity consisted
of hard core pornography, and that while perhaps he could not define it, he knew it when he saw it. 10 In response, a writer for the
Yale Law Journal commented that Justice Stewart had not seen it
yet and it was beginning to look as though he never would." The
prediction was prophetic. Nine years later, Justice Stewart joined
three of his colleagues in concluding that at least where sales to
consenting adults were concerned, and at least as to most types of
sexually explicit material, it was impossible to frame a test that
was not unconstitutionally vague.' 2
Since the 1950's the Supreme Court has embraced at least
3 the
three different tests for obscenity. In Roth v. United States,"
Court announced that obscenity was not constitutionally protected
speech-ignoring whether the photographs disseminated by Mr.
Roth were in fact obscene-and Mr. Roth went off to jail for
materials that, in later years at least, would probably have been
held protected." In Roth the Court made its first stab at defining
15 (1973). Only two justices have taken the view that obscene expression is protected by the first amendment. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
9. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 (footnotes omitted).
10. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
[obscene]").
11. Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364, 1377 (1966).
12. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., with
whom Stewart, J., and Marshall, J., join, dissenting). Justice Douglas dissented
separately.
13. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 476 (1957).
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obscenity: it was material which appealed to a prurient interest of
the average person-"
In this respect Roth was a step forward. It departed from the
English case of Regina v. Hicklin, 6 which had provided an important doctrinal basis for defining what was obscene. Under Hicklin,
material was to be judged in terms of its effect on the most susceptible members of the community, including children, and the obscene nature of particular material could be evaluated by the effect
of isolated passages and not by the work as a whole.17 The rule was
rejected in the 1930's in the prosecution of James Joyce's Ulysses.
In that case, both federal trial judge Wooley, and the appellate
judge, Augustus Hand, rejected the Hicklin rule in favor of a definition of obscenity which gauged the effect of the material as a
whole on the average person in the community. 8 That rule became
the law in Roth.
Roth rejected a challenge to the "fair notice" of the obscenity
statute in question. The law, the Court announced, did not require
impossible standards. 9 Ironically, sixteen years later, Justice Brennan, the author of the Roth opinion, would conclude that in fact it
was impossible to define obscenity clearly while at the same time
protecting expression that should not be suppressed.20
Having held obscenity not protected expression, the Court in
Roth hastened to try to close the door it seemed to have opened to
substantial censorship. In the area of sexual expression, the Roth
Court warned, "ceaseless vigilance" is required to prevent erosion
of fundamental freedoms of speech and press by Congress or by
the states. "The door barring federal and state intrusion into this
area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened
only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon
more important interests."'"
In A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
15. 354 U.S. at 489.
16. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
17. Id.
18. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1933), aff'd. sub. nom. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James
Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
19. 354 U.S. at 491.
20. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
21. 354 U.S. at 488.
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Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts22 the Court
seemed to close the door even more. Expanding on a statement in
Roth that obscenity was utterly without redeeming social value, 23 a
plurality of the Court announced a new three part test. To be obscene, material had to be utterly without redeeming social
value-defined as having no value at all. It had to appeal to a prurient-shameful or morbid-interest in sex. And it had to be patently offensive because it affronted contemporary national community standards relating to the depiction of sexual matters.2
Because two Justices, Black and Douglas, believed obscenity laws
violated the first amendment, the plurality view became the controlling law.25
The book in question in the Memoirs case was Fanny Hill, a
novel that depicted in explicit 18th-century prose the sexual adventures of a young woman in a whorehouse. The book was literally pornographic (writing about prostitutes), but the Court found
it was not obscene, much to the horror of its dissenting members.2 6
The new definition reflected the struggle within the Court over
how to define obscenity. Between 1957 and 1968, thirteen Supreme
Court obscenity decisions produced fifty-five separate opinions. In
1966, Justice Black captured the confusion created by the Court
and the serious constitutional implications of that confusion:
[A]fter the fourteen separate opinions handed down in these
three cases today no person, not even the most learned judge
much less a layman, is capable of knowing in advance of an ultimate decision in his particular case by this Court whether certain
material comes within the area of "obscenity ...."2
Unable to agree on the tests for what constituted obscenity, the
Court began dealing with obscenity cases summarily. Between 1967
and 1973 the Court reversed thirty-one obscenity convictions without benefit of opinion.2
22. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
23. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
24. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418.
25. 383 U.S. at 421 (Black, J., concurring); 383 U.S. at 424 (Douglas, J., concurring). See, e.g., United States v. 35 mm. Motion Picture Film Entitled "Language of Love", 432 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1970).
26. 383 U.S. at 441 (Clark, J., dissenting); 383 U.S. at 455 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 383 U.S. at 460 (White, J., dissenting).
27. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
28. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENiTy 44 (1976).
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In the meantime, lower courts and juries struggled with the
difficult task of applying the Supreme Court's tests for obscenity.
Some courts expressed concern about the prospect of allowing the
majority to dictate what the minority may read or watch:
In final analysis is freedom of speech and expression, including exhibition of motion picture films, to be based on the opinions
of 51 percent or even 80 percent of our populace? If so, it might
well be that on a national plebiscite the "Language of Love", "I
Am Curious (Yellow)", "Les Amants", "Memoirs" and others
would all be condemned by a majority vote. Minorities would
then read and see what their fellow men would decide to permit
them to read and see. The shadow of "1984" would indeed be
commencing to darken our horizon.29
Other courts noted that in fact the reading and viewing habits
of Americans seemed to include sexually explicit materials:
[T]he courts cannot be wholly oblivious to contemporary community standards. A glance at the "movie" advertisements in the
daily newspapers reveals that titillating but sure-fire announcement "For Adults Only" in a large number of ads ....
To gauge "contemporary community standards", a
glance at the Best Seller List (fiction and general) is revealing. A
best seller (general) records the response of hundreds of people,
wired on virtually every section of their anatomy to electrical recording devices, while they perform their sexual functions, naturally and artificially, under Kleig lights before a medical group
noting, cataloging and analyzing their every reaction. A best seller
(fiction), continuing and developing further a technique which
proved more than palatable to the community two years ago introduces a different nymphomaniac every few chapters and to
leave nothing to the imagination describes with particularity the
stalwart hero's chivalry in accommodating them."0
Nor did the interest in sexually oriented material seem to abate
with time. As the Second Circuit noted:
The proliferation of books and articles in the general area of
human sexuality by general practitioners, psychiatrists and psychologists, theologians and humorists, as well as manuals and
29. United States v. 35 mm. Motion Picture Film Entitled "Language of
Love", 432 F.2d 705, 715 (2d Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
30. United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled
"491", 367 F.2d 889, 896-97 (2d Cir. 1966) (footnotes omitted).
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films like the present one for laymen in the last five years would
indicate that the breadth of interest we discerned then has shown
no signs of abating. Masters & Johnson, Human Sexual Inadequacy, is presently No. 6 on the Best Seller List, the No. 1 spot
being occupied by Reuben, Everything You Always Wanted To
Know About Sex. Third on the list is "J", The Sensuous Woman
31

According to Publisher's Weekly, The Sensuous Man by "M"
was the number one best seller for 1971. Seven million paperback
copies of The Sensuous Woman were sold in 1970-71.1 2 These
books were followed by other popular books, all illustrated by
drawings or photographs, including The Joy of Sex, The Joy of
Gay Sex, Making Love, and a host of others.
The wide acceptability of sexually oriented books and films
suggested that the community might not be offended, and if it was,
the offense was hardly patent. The name of one case, United
States v. The Language of Love,3" epitomized the emerging struggle between those who sought to impose their ideas of decency on
those who sought greater freedom for sexual expression.
After Memoirs a number of courts began to take the "utterly"
without redeeming social value test seriously. Sexually explicit
books and movies discussing the history, politics, and sexual desirability of oral sex and sexual freedom in Denmark began to receive
constitutional protection, despite rather profuse illustrations.3 4 But
greater freedom for materials that many found desirable also
meant it was rore difficult to jail those selling far less desirable
publications.
In the meantime, a massive report by the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, released in 1970 after three
years of study, concluded that sexual materials sold to adults
should not be subject to criminal prosecution. 5 The Commission
further concluded that there was little demonstrable connection
between much sexually explicit material and anti-social behavior, 36
31. Language of Love, 432 F.2d at 713 n.6.
32. PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, Feb. 7, 1972, at 53.
33. 432 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1970).
34. E.g., United States v. Palledino, 475 F.2d 65 (1973); United States v.
Stewart, 336 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
35.

COMM'N ON OBSCENITY

SION ON OBSCENITY

AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMIS-

AND PORNOGRAPHY

23-26 (1970).

36. Id. But see Raleigh News & Observer, May 11, 1986, at 1A, col. 1 where a
new report by the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography finds that ex-
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a conclusion which seems to still be the predominant view among
social scientists.
President Nixon hotly rejected the report. He had campaigned
against the Supreme Court in 1968 announcing that the Court had
gone too far in strengthening the criminal forces against the peace
forces.3 7 By 1973 he had appointed four new justices. For purposes
of obscenity cases, the most critical appointment was that of Justice Lewis Powell in 1972 to replace Justice Hugo Black. Justice
Black, along with Justice Douglas, was one of two justices who held
that the first amendment prohibited obscenity laws. Justice Powell
provided the key fifth vote in a 5-4 majority in 1973 in Miller v.
3 8 There the Court
California.
formulated its third definition of obscenity in sixteen years.
The direction the Court took in Miller was by no means foreordained. The 1969 case of Stanley v. Georgia9 held that criminal
prosecution of the private possession of obscene materials violated
the first amendment. In so holding, the Court noted that the real
interest of the state in regulating obscenity lay in the distribution
rather than the private possession of obscene matter. Obscene expression, so long as it was privately possessed and not distributed,
was entitled to first amendment protection.
The state in the Stanley case had argued that it had an interest in protecting individuals from the morally corrupting influence
of obscenity. The Court rejected that argument as "wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment."4 Second,
the state argued that it had an interest in preventing sexual violence caused in part by the consumption of obscene materials. The
Court rejected that argument on the grounds that "[tihere appears
to be little empirical basis for that assertion" and that there existed a variety of less restrictive alternatives available to combat
anti-social conduct that might result from the consumption of obposure to most pornography bears a relationship to sexual aggression. However,
the report has been heavily criticized by many of the researchers whose data was
used in the Commission's findings. The researchers have criticized the report as a
biased reading of inconclusive data. Raleigh News & Observer, May 18, 1986, at
5A, col. 1.

37. A. SINGER,

CAMPAIGN SPEECHES OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

1928-1972, 361

(1976).
38. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
39. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
40. Id. at 566.
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scene materials." Finally, the state argued that it had an interest
in controlling the sale and distribution of obscenity. The Court rejected that argument as a justification for prosecuting the private
possession of obscene materials on overbreadth grounds.4 2 So the
Stanley Court seemed to require some justification for obscenity
regulation other than the simple desire to control the moral quality
of the thoughts of the citizenry.
Yet cases immediately following Stanley refused to extend its
holding beyond the home."3 In response, Justice Black protested
that the freedom established in Stanley was the freedom to write a
book in the attic, print it in the basement, and read it in the living
room.

44

Any notion that the Stanley holding might eventually be extended to cover the right to purchase or to disseminate obscene
materials was squarely rejected in Miller and its companion
cases.4 1 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, announced a
new definition of obscenity. According to Chief Justice Burger, the
new definition would overcome problems of vagueness and overbreadth. 46 The new test was as follows:
(a) [W]hether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.4
Under this formulation, the "utterly without redeeming social
value test" had been replaced with a new one-the material must
lack "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." 48 Under
the old test the material had to be patently offensive because it
affronted contemporary national standards relating to the descrip41. Id.
42. Id. at 568.
43. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
44. Id. at 382 (Black, J., dissenting).
45. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12
200-Ft. Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1972); United States v. Orito,
413 U.S. 139 (1973).
46. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
48. Id.
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tion or representation of sexual matters. National standards would
be replaced with community standards, and the community apparently could be statewide or local. The prurient interest test was
similar in both cases.4 9
Vagueness was overcome, according to the Court, by a new list
of sexual acts which were potentially obscene.5 0 (Portrayal of the
acts could be written or pictorial.) The sexual expression that
could be banned included actual or simulated intercourse and lewd
exhibition of the genitals. These acts were to be written into state
law. If material lacked such sexual conduct, then the vendor could
know that the product was safe. If the sexual conduct was present,
then the vendor would know that his public and commercial activities might bring prosecution."
All that was true enough. The only thing it overlooked was the
fact that the books and films now brought within the potential
scope of state criminal statutes included an extraordinary number
of books, magazines, and films from reputable publishers and producers, materials that were being consumed by millions of Americans each year.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Miller group of decisions was Justice Brennan's dissent. Justice Brennan had written
a majority of the Court's obscenity decisions.2 He had constructed
the tests in Roth and in Memoirs. He had upheld the convictions
in Ginzburg5 3 and in other cases. 54 But now Justice Brennan concluded that the attempt to define obscenity in situations involving
sales to willing adults (where children were not involved and where
unwilling viewers were not affronted), was hopeless.
It was one of the most remarkable changes of position in the
history of the Court. Between the power of the state to compel
adults to read only acceptable books and the protection of first
49. Id.
50. Id. at 25.
51. Id. at 27.
52. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51 (1965); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
53. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
54. E.g., Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
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amendment rights, Justice Brennan came down on the side of first
amendment rights, stating:
[A]fter 16 years of experimentation and debate I am reluctantly
forced to the conclusion that none of the available formulas, including the one announced today, can reduce the vagueness to a
tolerable level while at the same time striking an acceptable balance between the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on the one hand, and on the other the asserted state interest in regulating the dissemination of certain sexually oriented
materials. Any effort to draw a constitutionally acceptable boundary on state power must resort to such indefinite concepts as
"prurient interest," "patent offensiveness," "serious literary
value," and the like. The meaning of these concepts necessarily
varies with the experience, outlook and even idiosyncrasies of the
person defining them. Although we have assumed that obscenity
does exist and that we "know it when [we] see it," we are manifestly unable to describe it in advance except by reference to concepts so elusive that they fail to distinguish clearly between protected and unprotected speech.
• . . The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that all criminal laws provide fair notice of "what the
State commands or forbids." In the service of this general principle we have repeatedly held that the definition of obscenity must
provide adequate notice of exactly what is prohibited from dissemination .

. .

. In this context, even the most painstaking ef-

forts to determine in advance whether certain sexually oriented
expression is obscene must inevitably prove unavailing. For the
insufficiency of the notice compels persons to guess not only
whether their conduct is covered by a criminal statute, but also
whether their conduct falls within the constitutionally permissible
reach of the statute. The resulting level of uncertainty is utterly
intolerable, not alone because it makes "[b]ook selling.

. .

a haz-

ardous profession," but as well because it invites arbitrary and
erratic enforcement of the law. 55
In the Miller group of cases, the Court set out the justifications for the prosecution of those who consume and disseminate
"obscene" expression. The Court offered three justifications: First,
the possible causal relation between such materials and anti-social
conduct, including criminal activity; second, the effect on the total
community environment; and third, the effect on the "privacies" of
55. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84, 86-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss3/1

12

1986]

Curtis: Obscenity:
The Justices' (Not
So) New Robes
N.C. OBSCENITY
STATUTE

399

third parties." In offering those justifications, the Court conceded
that "there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material . . . . ,5 One crucial factor for
the Court was the right of the state to regulate the moral quality of
its communities. The majority concluded that such a legislative
judgment should not be disturbed by the courts.58
Miller announced that national standards were unascertainable and nonexistent.5 9 The "utterly without redeeming social value
test" was meaningless.6 0 So it seemed that the unlucky defendants
who had been convicted under those standards might have their
convictions reversed. A meaningless and unknowable standard
might be thought not to give defendants fair notice. The four dissenting justices now agreed such tests were unconstitutionally
vague.
In a later decision it became apparent that freeing convicted
disseminators of obscenity wasnot what the Court majority had in
mind in Miller. In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court explained that the previous tests had been denounced as meaningless, ambiguous, and unknowable for the purpose of replacing them
with different tests. But such tests were quite good enough to meet
a vagueness challenge.6 1
B.

The North Carolina Response

In the meantime, in North Carolina, the law zigged and zagged
to follow the definitions of the Supreme Court. After the Memoirs
decision and after a federal court found the prior North Carolina
statute unconstitutional for failure to comply with Memoirs, 2 the
legislature passed a new statute embodying the Memoirs test.6 3 In
some cases, juries convicted and convictions were affirmed." In
over half the cases however, juries acquitted where sexually ex56. Id. at 58-59.
57. Id. at 60.
58. Id. at 69.

59. 413 U.S. 15, 31.
60. Id. at 24-25.
61. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
62. Shinall v. Worrell, 319 F. Supp. 485 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
63. 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 405, (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14190.1 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1985)). The 1971 statute repealed the prior statute,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1 (1969). See State v. McCluney, 280 N.C. 404, 185

S.E.2d 870 (1972).
64. E.g., State v. Bryant, 16 N.C. App. 456, 192 S.E.2d 693 (1972).
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plicit books from "adult" book stores were involved."5 Judges also
failed to find all sexually explicit expression obscene."' From the
censor's point of view, this was an unsatisfactory state of affairs. In
1973 the Supreme Court seemed to come to the rescue in the
Miller case with its broader definition of obscenity.
Yet after Miller, a remarkable thing happened in North Carolina. Some state legislators, concerned with the first amendment
implications of the Miller case, persuaded the legislature to require
a prior adversary civil hearing before the state could initiate an
obscenity prosecution. 7 At such a hearing, the defendant would be
permitted to offer evidence. If a judge found the material in question to be obscene, then it could be seized and destroyed. But it
was not a crime to sell the book or show the movie unless the judge
had ruled particular materials obscene and the conduct continued
after the hearing.6 8 Later, the adversary hearing requirement was
refined to exclude sales to children and display to unwilling
viewers.6 9
By requiring the prior adversary civil proceeding, North Carolina had effectively taken care of the vagueness problem. Except
for sales to children and imposition on unwilling viewers, no one
could be arrested unless he disseminated an item after a judge had
ruled it obscene in a hearing. Book sellers and film exhibitors knew
exactly where they stood. For regular booksellers and theaters the
chilling effect of penalties for disseminating obscenity was eliminated. And there would be no informal censorship by warnings
from the vice squad. No one would go to jail unless he or she had
fair notice that the material in question had previously been found
obscene by a court.
Later, North Carolina passed a statewide nuisance statute that
65. E.g., State v. Weinke, Nos. 71CRS26052 & 72CRS706, (Durham County
Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 1972); State v. Bell, No. 71CRS26053, (Durham County Super.

Ct. Mar. 25, 1972); State v. Richardson, No. 72CR4351, (Onslow County Dist. Ct.
Apr. 1, 1972); State v. Thille, Nos. 71CRS21571 & 71CRS21572, (Cumberland
County Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1972).
66. E.g., State v. Thille, No. 71CR21570, (Cumberland County Dist. Ct. Sept.
3, 1971) (Photo Illustrated Oralism and Sexual Intercourse).

67. N.C.
N.C.

GEN.

14-190.2 (1981), repealed by 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 703,
14-190.2 (Cum. Supp. 1985). See State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213

GEN. STAT. §

STAT. §

S.E.2d 291 (1975) (no arrest or indictment until adversary judicial determination

that material in question is obscene and thereafter disseminated by accused).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (1981).
69. Id. at § 14-190.2(h) (1981).
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seemed to be of doubtful constitutionality. 70 Injunctions could be
issued to ban the sale of obscenity. State and federal courts have
upheld the statute7' but for reasons not very clear, the nuisance
statute has not been widely used to control obscenity.
Finally, in the 1985 legislative session, the North Carolina
General Assembly, with the backing of the new Democratic Attorney General, the new Republican Governor and the United States
Attorney for the Eastern District, changed the obscenity law in a
way that went as far as its sponsors thought possible in suppressing sexually explicit expression. The basic tests for obscenity-prurient interest, patent offensiveness, and lack of serious
value-were taken from Miller. The "fair warning" adversary hearing was eliminated. 2 This change was advertised as necessary to
effectively curb pornography, including child pornography.73 In
fact, child pornography had largely disappeared from commercial
establishments because of a tough new federal law on the subject."'
At any rate, child pornography could simply have been withdrawn
from the adversary hearing just as the legislature had done with
the sale and display of obscene materials to minors and the display
of obscene materials-to unwilling viewers. Despite the articulated
concern for child pornography, the potential effect of the statute
seems to be the suppression of all sexually explicit expression
through the threat of harsh criminal penalties.
In the new North Carolina statute, the requirement of the
prior North Carolina statute that material lack educational value
to be obscene was eliminated, 75 making it easier to apply the statute to a wide range of explicit sex education materials available in
major book stores from major publishers. The prior requirement
that dissemination take place in a public place was eliminated 7
and no requirement that the dissemination be commercial was inserted, making possible the prosecution of a wife who showed sexu70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1(a) (1981). For discussion regarding the constitutionality of controlling obscenity through the North Carolina nuisance statute, see
Note, Control of Obscenity Through Enforcement of a Nuisance Statute, 4
CAMPBELL L. REV., 139 (1981).
71. Fehlhaber v. North Carolina, 675 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1982).
72. 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 703, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
73. See Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model
Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535 (1981).
74. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2252-55 (Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1986)
75. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
76. Id.
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ally explicit material to her husband, or of one adult who showed it
to another." The statute was changed to include "lewd" nudity
and simulated sexual acts.78 Moreover, instead of a two-year misdemeanor as in the prior statute, the crime became a three-year
felony. One adult who showed a Penthouse magazine to another
might face a presumptive 7 9sentence of two years in prison and a
possible six-year sentence.
The new North Carolina statute assumed that under community standards it was intolerable for adults to view sexually explicit
films or books showing other adults engaged in sexual acts. In fact,
however, a recent survey of national public opinion indicates public opposition to such broad restrictions.8 In Maine, over seventy
percent of the voters rejected a proposed pornography statute similar to North Carolina's.8 1 Surveys of public opinion in Forsyth and
Guilford Counties (used as evidence by the defense in obscenity
prosecutions), show most adults found it acceptable for other
adults to see representations of other adults engaged in actual or
simulated sexual intercourse.2
The results of prosecution as of May 1, 1986 show no consensus. One jury has convicted, one has acquitted, two have failed to
on some sexually explicit
reach agreement, and one has convicted
83
magazines and acquitted on others.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE LAW-THE REAL
WORLD AND THE JUDGES' WORLD

One basic problem with the North Carolina statute is its
vagueness. It is impossible for an accused to know in advance
whether his or her conduct falls on the permitted or forbidden side
77. Id. But cf. Stanley v. Georgia., 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (first amendment prohibits making mere private possession of obscene material a crime); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute forbidding use of contraceptives held to
violate the right of marital privacy).
78. Previously, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 had been limited to representations of actual sexual intercourse and exhibition of the genitals in the context of
sexual activity.
79. See infra note 109.
80. NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1985 at 60. Sixty-six percent of adults believed
adults should be allowed to rent X-rated videos provided there was no public
display of such videos. Fifty-two percent supported the right to buy magazines
showing adults in sexual relations under the same circumstances.
81. New York Times, June 12, 1986, at 17, col. 2.
82. See appendix for Guilford and Forsyth County Surveys.
83. Greensboro Daily News, Mar. 16, 1986, at E2, col. 1.
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of the line regulating sexual expression. As a result, the statute has
the effect of inhibiting much expression that is deserving of first
amendment protection. Greatly increased punishment increases
the chilling effect of the statute.
The criminal sanction, a necessity in an ordered society, is "an
exercise of one of government's most awesome and dangerous powers." 4 The Supreme Court has noted that vague criminal statutes
offend important values. Vague criminal statutes fail to give appropriate notice to those who may be prosecuted. As Chief Justice
Warren once said:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by
a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed.85
In addition, vague laws allow for discriminatory enforcement,
delegating "basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." ' But the
vice of vagueness is particularly noxious where the statute deals
with expression.8 7 The fact that people cannot tell clearly what is
permitted and what is prohibited means that they avoid protected
conduct out of fear of prosecution. Society loses protected expression. The Miller test warns book sellers that sexually explicit expression may bring prosecution.88 It gives them full notice of the
danger faced. What it fails to do with any success at all is to help
the book seller segregate in advance the protected from the
forbidden.
The vagueness of the Miller tests in the North Carolina statute is apparent from an examination of them. To be obscene, material must appeal to the prurient interest, lack serious value, and
describe sex in a patently offensive way-one which affronts community standards. 89 Prurient interest is an unhealthy, shameful or
84. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 477 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
85. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (footnote omitted).
86. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
87. Id.; Hines v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976).
88. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
89. Id.
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morbid interest in sex. The fact that the material is erotic is not
enough, though if the material is not erotic it does not meet the
prurient interest test. In fact, the Supreme Court has recently indicated that a statute banning material that arouses healthy "lust"
goes beyond what is constitutionally permissible."
The second part of the test is that material must depict sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way. The conduct, spelled out in
the North Carolina law, is actual or simulated sexual intercourse,
including anal and oral intercourse, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. Except for the puzzling question of what exhibitions of the
genitals are "lewd", the definition of sexual conduct seems relatively clear. But more is required. The conduct is, as one court
noted, only a threshold test. Once it is satisfied, the trier of fact
must go on to consider whether the material is in fact offensive to
the standards of the community."1
In 1973, Justice Burger announced that hard core pornography, which apparently meant any material showing or describing
sexual acts, could speak for itself 92 No further evidence was re-

quired to show that the material actually affronted contemporary
community standards, or was prurient, or lacked value. 3 Still, patent offensiveness and prurient appeal were questions of fact. What
was tolerable in New York City, the Court was fond of saying,
might not be acceptable in Maine.94 ,
The patent offensiveness test assumes that consensus is required for a standard to exist. Chief Justice Burger rejected national standards because the nation was too large for one standard,
"even assuming that the prerequisite consensus exists."95
The tests for obscenity may work with fair predictability in a
community where consensus reigns. In most places in modern
America, however, no consensus exists because members of the
community have very different personal tastes and standards.
Because sexually oriented material generates such strong emotional reactions (by both the proponents and opponents of censor90. Brockett v. Spokane Arcade, 105 S.Ct. 2794 (1985). See also Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (to be obscene material must be erotic in some
sense).
91. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Material, 709 F.2d 132, 135
(2d Cir. 1983).
92. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973).
93. Id.
94. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
95. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
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ship) tests like serious value, patent offensiveness, and prurient interest have little objective content. As Justice Brennan noted, "the
meaning of these concepts necessarily varies with the experience,
outlook and even idiosyncrasies of the person defining them."' 6 As
the foreman of the Winston-Salem jury that deadlocked eight to
four for acquittal put it: "An awful lot is left up to interpretation
' '9
and personal feelings. 7
Jury verdicts under these tests constitute the work of a "tiny
autonomous legislature."98 And since each jury is composed of different individuals, the effect, as Judge Frank noted thirty years
ago, is "hundreds of diverse jury-legislatures" enacting "hundreds
of diverse statutes," each reflecting its own particular moral sensibilities.99 As one dissenting juror in the Winston-Salem case candidly noted: "I believe that as jurors, we were supposed to re1 '
present the community and establish the community standard.""
But as Justice Black observed, "a case-by-case assessment of social
values by individual judges and jurors is, I think, a dangerous technique for government to utilize in determining whether a man
stays in or out of the penitentiary."' 0 '
The situation is made much worse by the fact that each book
or magazine or motion picture film disseminated may be a six-year
felony. There comes a point where quantitative changes produce
qualitative ones. The escalation and the punishment of dissemination of obscenity is such a case. As a result the legislature has deterred protected speech.
The policy behind the rules against vagueness and the different rules against prior restraint is to make sure that protected
speech reaches the public. Escalated punishments for obscene
speech have the same effect as prior restraints or vague statutes-they chill protected speech, restraining it at the source.1" 2
96. Id. at 84, (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Winston-Salem Journal, Mar. 13, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
98. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 822 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
99. Id. at 823.
100. Winston-Salem Journal, Mar. 13, 1986 at 1, col. 1 (emphasis added).
101. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480 (1966).
102. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statute provided that unless
publisher proved that publication was true, published with good motives, and for
justifiable ends, the publication is suppressed and further publication is punishable as contempt); Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976)
(ordinance requiring advance notice of political or charitable solicitation held unconstitutionally vague because of potentially inhibiting effect on speech).
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They do so by increasing the penalties for guessing wrong as to
whether or not certain materials are obscene.
In fact, in North Carolina suppression of protected expression
is exactly what is going on. A college professor who has taught a
course on freedom of expression has taken the sexually explicit exhibits out of his lectures on obscenity. Booksellers have removed
from the shelves illustrated sexual guides provided by major

publishers. 103
State judges have typically treated the Miller tests as though
they had definite meaning. Some jurors, on the other hand, have
been more candid about problems with the law. They sometimes
utter embarrassing truths: "I personally don't know what an ordinary adult or average person in Forsyth County would consider the
community standard. If I could be dictator for a day, then I know
where I would draw the line. But I suspect that we would all draw
lines in different places." 10 4 A juror in Greensboro who thought
"it's all filth" and who voted to convict nonetheless seemed to concede the absence of one community standard in Guilford County.
"We all come from different communities, and we all feel very
' ' °5
differently. 1
Even the courts cannot apply the tests with predictability. After Miller, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled the critically acclaimed film Carnal Knowledge to be obscene."0 6 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the film did not even
07
involve sufficient sexual conduct to meet the threshold test."
Needless to say, to reach its decision the Supreme Court of Georgia had to conclude that the film lacked serious value. In North
Carolina, the film Memories Within Miss Aggie was found to have
serious value by one Superior Court judge and no value by
another. 0 8
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found an issue of Pent103. Greensboro News & Record, Mar. 9, 1986, at E4, col.1.
104. See supra note 100 at 4, col. 2.
105. Greensboro News & Record Mar. 29, 1986 at D1, col. 6.
106. See Jenkins v. Georgia., 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973), rev'd, 418
U.S. 153 (1974).
107. Id.
108. See State ex rel. Yeager v. Neal, 26 N.C. App. 741, 217 S.E.2d 576
(1975) where the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed for technical reasons a
decision from Forsyth County. In Guilford County, Judge Rousseau reached the
opposite result.
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house magazine to be obscene. 10 9 The case illustrates however, that
the Miller standards simply cannot be applied in a consistent or
meaningful way. The District Judge had found that Penthouse
magazine did not appeal to a prurient interest, depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, or lack serious value. 110
The appellate court reversed. Despite its observation that
Penthouse had an annual worldwide circulation of 60 million copies and that the issue in question contained foreign policy analysis,
fiction, and film reviews, two members of the panel found the
magazines lacked value, appealed to the prurient interest, and
were patently offensive. The dissenter found Penthouse not to be
prurient and to have serious value. After all was said and done,
four federal judges had scrutinized Penthouse. Two found it had
serious value. Two found it valueless."' The case illustrates the
truth of the observation made by Justice Brennan when he quoted
Justice Black in Paris Adult Theatre I:
For I know of no satisfactory answer to the assertion by Mr. Justice Black, "after the 14 separate opinions handed down" in the
trilogy of the cases decided in 1966, that "no person, not even the
most learned judge much less a layman, is capable of knowing in
advance of an ultimate decision in his particular case ...
whether certain material comes within the area of obscenity."'' 2

IV.

THE TESTS ON TRIAL

Troublesome as the statute is in general, its application at
trial is even worse. The difficulty of proving what the community
finds offensive has been solved by a wave of the judicial wand. In
1973, Chief Justice Burger announced that hard core pornography,
which apparently meant any material showing or describing sexual
acts or "lewd" genitals, could speak for itself." 3 No further evidence was required to show that the material actually affronted
contemporary community standards or was prurient or lacked
value." 4 Still, patent offensiveness and prurient appeal were questions of fact. 5
109. Penthouse International, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d. 1353 (5th Cir.
1980).
110. Penthouse International, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 436 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ga.

1977).
111. See supra notes 109-10.
112. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 87 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1966)).
113. Paris Adult Theatre I at 56 n.6.
114. Id.
115. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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When a jury is told that the "materials speak for themselves"
and that the state is not required to prove the things the statute
sets out as the elements of the crime (except by presenting the
materials) problems with obscenity statutes are seriously
aggravated.
The contradictory truth about materials speaking for themselves has been noted by the Second Circuit: "While the materials
provide the best evidence of their substantive content, they do not
supply any information about the community standards by which
they are to be judged."11' 6 But if the materials themselves provide
no information about community standards, then they do not answer by themselves whether they meet the patent offensiveness
test. What the courts really mean by saying that the materials
speak for themselves is simply that the prosecution is not required
to offer proof of the things the law requires it to prove.
This leaves two possibilities. The jury may in fact "know"
from its experience, without any assistance whatsoever, what community standards are. In large and diverse communities, this possibility seems unlikely. There is no answer, really, to the embarrassing truth uttered by Judge Jerome Frank years ago: no social
scientist would regard the jury as a truly representative sample of
the community."
The other possibility is that the jury does not know what community standards really are. Sex is a private area of most people's
lives. Many, perhaps most, people do not discuss their sex lives
with their friends and casual acquaintances. (This fact reflects privacy, not shame, for surely the love life of a married couple is not
shameful.) The same reserve is probably true, to a lesser degree,
with reference to the pornography people choose to view.
If the jury is not aware of community standards, what will it
do? Ideally, of course, it should acquit. But language about materials speaking for themselves and using personal experiences may
give the jury a different message, the message that once the juror
has looked at the book he has all the evidence he needs. The message about the book speaking for itself may be read by the juror to
116. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Material 709 F.2d 132, 135
(2d Cir. 1983).
117. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 822 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.,
concurring).
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imply that the juror has been elected censor for a day and that he
may ban books and films at personal whim-or at least based on
the limited experience of the juror and his friends. In federal trials
the Supreme Court will not even permit inquiry during voir dire
into whether or not jurors know community standards.' 8
As a result of statements by jurors to the press we have some
idea of how the-system works in fact. In Forsyth County the majority of the jurors took the test seriously and without knowledge of
what the community standard was, voted to acquit. But a minority
juror followed the scarcely-veiled invitation the statute gives to follow personal views. As she explained, "I believe as jurors, we were
supposed to represent the community and establish the community standard."" 9
In Greensboro, jurors were told that the prosecution need not
present expert evidence and the jurors could base their decision on
obscenity on their own experience. One juror explained that she
used the standards of people in her home, at work and at church in
deciding whether the material was obscene.' 0 This approach leaves
out a substantial portion of the community. It also takes as assumed the attitudes and behavior of people in an area most regard
as private, and which may not even have been the subject of much
discussion in the limited community. Although jurors in Greensboro were told to use the standards of Guilford County and to
judge the materials based on their experience, a number interpreted the instruction to mean that they should judge the materials based on much smaller and more intimate communities. "We
all come from different communities, and we all feel very differently,"' 2 one of the Guilford jurors who voted for conviction
explained.
There are practical steps that appellate courts can take under
state law to reduce the danger posed by the statute. Jurors should
be told explicitly that they need to consider the ,views of all adults
in the county in arriving at community standards and that in considering this matter the jurors should consider both the evidence
offered in the case as well as their own experience. Futhermore jurors should affirmatively be told that if they do not believe they
know what the standards of the entire community are it is their
118.
119.
120.
121.

Smith v. United States 431 U.S. 291, 308 (1977).
Winston-Salem Journal, Mar. 13, 1986 at 1, col. 1 (emphasis added).
Greensboro News & Record, Mar. 20, 1986, at D2, col. 5.
Id. at col. 6.
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duty to acquit.'2 2
How is the test for patent offensiveness to be explained to the
jury? What does it mean that materials affront the standards of
the community? Where the dissemination is to adults, the community to be affronted is made up of adults. The material is then
may not be limited
tested by what is acceptable to adults. 12Adults
3
to reading matter fit only for children.
The better test for patent offensiveness is one of toleration.
Does the community find it intolerable for adults who wish to view
the material to do so? There is language in opinions of the Court
to suggest that tolerance is the test. "[C]ontemporary community
standards must be applied by juries in accordance with their understanding of the tolerance of the average person in their community . . .. "14 In New York v. Ferber,'2" the Court also indicated
that the question was "a community's toleration for sexually oriented material .
,,12'A number of state courts have followed a
"..
standard of tolerance. 12 7 Others have followed somewhat different
28
standards.
State courts, with their own constitutions, should consider the
implications of harsh new censorship acts for freedom of expression. At the very least they could and should require obscenity trials to be conducted under substantive and procedural standards
which will give freedom of expression a fair chance of survival in
the arena of a jury trial. One standard that should be required
under the state constitution is a standard of tolerance. Both Colorado and Tennessee have found such a standard required by their
129
state constitutions.
The defendant in an obscenity case needs to try to overcome
the dangers of a purely subjective (and perhaps even hypocritical)
decision. There are several ways of doing so. Because the evidence
the defendant is permitted to offer has a crucial bearing on
whether or not the jury will view the question objectively or en122. Commonwealth v. Mascolo, 7 Mass. App. 275, 386 N.E.2d 1311 (1979).
123. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); Pinkus v. United States, 436
U.S. 293 (1978).
124. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977).

125. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).

126. Id. at 761 n.12.
127. Leech v. American Booksellers Association, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn.
1979); People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985).
128. State v. Barrett, 278 S.C. 92, 292 S.E.2d 590, 592 (1982).
129. See supra note 127.
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tirely subjectively, undue restrictions on proof should be scrutinized with care under the law of the land clause in the North Caro30

lina Constitution.1

The best way for the defendant to offer evidence on the issue
of community standards is by a scientifically conducted survey of
public opinion. A number of state appellate courts have considered
surveys in obscenity cases.13 ' The better reasoned and prevailing
state authorities support admission of surveys.
In Saliba v. State,132 the court reversed a conviction for exclusion of public opinion surveys. The court noted that the jury is
permitted to find obscenity based only on examination of the
items.
However, expert evidence on this issue may be highly relevant. The jurors are not instructed to evaluate obscenity based on
their personal opinions but are charged with applying contemporary community standards ....

In the absence of expert testi-

mony, the jury's determination of contemporary community standards runs the risk of incorporating the individual juror's
"necessarily limited, hit or miss subjective view on the basis of his
personal upbringing or restricted reflection or particular experience of life." . . . Consequently, the defendant in an obscenity

prosecution is entitled to introduce relevant and appropriate expert testimony on the issue of contemporary community
standards.
Expert testimony based on a public opinion poll is uniquely
suited to a determination of community standards. Perhaps no
other form of evidence is more helpful or concise: "A properly
conducted public opinion survey itself adequately ensures a good
measure of trustworthiness, and its admission may be necessary
in the sense that no other evidence would be as good as the survey evidence or perhaps even obtainable as a practical matter."' 33
130. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. Where a defense turns upon a factual adjudication, the defendant has a constitutional right to an adequate and fair hearing
including the opportunity to test, explain, or rebut evidence received by the court.
In re Gupton, 238 N.C. 303, 77 S.E.2d 716 (1953).
131. Saliba v. State, - Ind. App. -, 475 N.E.2d 1181 (1985); Carlock v.
State, 609 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); People v. Nelson, 88 Ill. App. 3d
196, 410 N.E.2d 476 (1980). Contra Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d
669, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
132. Ind. App. -, 475 N.E.2d 1181 (1985).
133. Id. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 1185 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 165 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374
Mass. 796, 803, 374 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (1978)).
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The court concluded that the poll was relevant. It rejected the
argument that the poll should have been excluded because the particular item alleged obscene was not shown to the respondents. It
also rejected an attack on the wording of the questions.
We must emphasize that the majority of the community need
not desire to view sexually explicit materials in order to establish
community acceptance or tolerance of such materials. Rather the
issue concerns the population's perception of what is generally acceptable in the community considering the intended and probable
recipients of the materials.' 3 4
In Carlock v. State,'135 the court held the exclusion of a similar
poll to be reversible error. The court held that objections to the
survey raised by the State went to the weight of the evidence, and
not admissibility.
In another case involving a similar poll, People v. Nelson,'36
the court noted: "The survey established that the majority of Illinois adults found it acceptable to view, buy, or read such material
as contained in the movies . . . . This weighs heavily against a
finding that the movies are patently offensive. '37 The court
concluded:
[T]he survey results are strong evidence that the community
standard would accept or at least would not reject the portrayal
of sexually explicit material in movies when access to the movies
is limited to adult viewers. In fact, survey evidence may be the
only way to prove degree of acceptability ....1-18
The court ruled that excluding the survey left the jurors in ignorance and deprived the defendant of the right to introduce the best
evidence he could on community standards.13 9
Just as juries should be allowed to know the true state of public opinion, other evidence bearing on community standards should
be admissible, to ensure that juries are not required to make their
decisions in a factual vacuum. The better reasoned cases hold that
the defendant is entitled to offer evidence of comparable materials
which in fact enjoy wide acceptance in the community. Avid acceptance of X-rated videos in the community tends to show that
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Saliba, Ind. App. at __,
475 N.E.2d at 1186.
609 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
88 Il.App. 3d 196, 410 N.E.2d 476 (1980).
88 Ill.
App. 3d 196, 198-99, 410 N.E.2d 476, 478.
Id. at 199, 410 N.E.2d at 479.
Id.
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adult viewing of the depiction of sexual acts by other adults does
not affront community standards. 40
If Penthouse magazine is filled with pictures of things within
the list of sexual conduct described in the statute, jurors should be
permitted to know something about the circulation and acceptability of the magazine.""
Of course there should be limits. The number of such exhibits
must be limited in the interest of time. But if the same type of
sexual conduct is portrayed in two publications, the question of
142
comparability should be for the jury.
Courts have taken different approaches to the question of
proof of community standards. Some judges have suggested that it
would violate constitutional guarantees to exclude such evidence.14 3 Others have set formidable barriers to overcome in an effort to get information to the jury. 44 The barriers themselves raise
constitutional questions.1 45
V.

CONCLUSION

This article attempts to suggest solutions. One possible solution is to limit prosecutions to cases of direct, certain and immediate harm caused by clearly definable materials. A second possible
solution is legislative. Because of the chilling effect, obscenity laws
should not be coupled with harsh punishments. More important
however, categories subject to regulation should be severely limited
so as to reflect broad social consensus. For many classes of sexually-oriented materials the adversary hearing should be restored.
Exclusion from the adversary hearing should be made with a scalpel, not with a meat ax.
State courts should take a fresh look at the vexed question of
140. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Material, 709 F.2d 132 (2d
Cir. 1983); Berg v. State, 599 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Keller v. State,
606 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); People v. Heller, 96 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1,
157 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1979).
141. See 2 E. DEVETT & C. BLACKMER, FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 62.07 at
534 (1977).
142. Id.
143. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 167 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (right to introduce such evidence should be a requirement of due
process).
144. E.g., Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, cert. denied, 448
U.S. 888 (1980).
145. The effect is to exacerbate the vagueness problem.
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obscenity in light of experience. The North Carolina Constitution,
like virtually all state constitutions, prohibits vague criminal statutes. ' With the history of enforcement and interpretation of the
new obscenity statute, the North Carolina courts are now in a position to compare the facts to the rule. At least as to those types of
material for which no consensus exists, the North Carolina statute
is in fact unconstitutionally vague as applied. One solution to the
vagueness problem would be to find an adversary hearing constitutionally required, at least as to materials for which no consensus
exists. No cases yet seem to support these results. But the tests are
clear and the facts are there for judges who choose to look.
Short of holding the statute unconstitutional as a matter of
state constitutional law, the state court should require trials that
reduce instead of enhance the subjectivity of the result. Liberal admission of state and defense evidence of community standards (including materials showing comparable sexual activity), requiring
affirmative proof by the prosecution, and cautionary instructions
designed to avoid purely subjective reactions should all be required
47
under state constitutional law.1
Running throughout the history of obscenity regulation is the
problem of squaring such regulation with first amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court's initial answer was to distinguish
types of expression and to deal with obscenity as expression which
is not protected by the first amendment. The last thirty years of
obscenity regulation have shown the difficulty of that route. Distinguishing sexually explicit speech which is protected from that
which is not protected has proved extraordinarily difficult.
The criminal sanction, because of its tremendous power and
potential for abuse, should be employed in a limited fashion. Other
avenues in a free society are available to convey one's abhorrence
of the propagation of bad values: pamphleteering, preaching and
organizing. Indeed, as Judge Frank noted:
Public opinion, by influencing social attitudes, may create a
convention, with no governmental "sanction" behind it, far more
coercive than any statute ....

146. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. See also State v. Sanders, 37 N.C. App. 53, 245
S.E.2d 397 (1969) (criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to inform citizens
of common intelligence of the particular acts which are forbidden).
147. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 and supra note 127. So far, there has been
little consideration of the question as a matter of state constitutional law.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss3/1
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• . . [E]xperience teaches that democratically exercised censorship by public opinion has far more potency, and is far less
easily evaded, then censorship by government. The incessant
struggle to influence public opinion is of the very essence of the
democratic process. The basic purpose of the First Amendment is
to keep that struggle alive, by not permitting the dominant public
opinion of the present to become embodied in legislation which
will prevent the formation of a different dominant public opinion
inthe future.
[D]emocracy accepts the postulate that in the long run,
the struggle to sway public opinion will produce the wisest
policies.' 4 8
To the extent that the criminal sanction in the obscenity context is imposed to prevent direct, immediate, and certain harm to
identifiable third parties and identifies behavior with sufficient
specificity to alleviate vagueness concerns, the imposition of the
sanction may be justified. The problem grows murkier when harm
is less immediate and certain' 4 9 particularly since the effect of sex0
ual material on aggression is dubious.'1
Basically the state justifies its regulation of sexual expression
by the effect on the moral character and values of the community.
This is perhaps the oldest and most deeply entrenched reason offered for obscenity regulation. The argument is that obscene
materials promote bad values and that the state has an interest in
promoting good values among its citizens.
There are difficulties with this concept even assuming that imposing the criminal sanction on consenting adults for the purpose
of improving their moral values is wise and compatible with a free
society-as it may well be. The first problem is in defining what is
and what is not obscene. The second is in segregating those types
of sexually explicit materials which promote good values from
148. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 805 & nn.10-11 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Frank, J., concurring), aft'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
149. See MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, YALE L. & P. REV. 321, 338 (1984).
150. Baron, The Aggression-Inhibiting Influence of Heightened Sexual

Arousal, 30 J.

OF PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGY

318 (1974); Baron and Bell, Sex-

ual Arousal and Aggression by Males: Effects of Types of Erotic Stimuli and
PriorProvocation, 35 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 79 (1977); Donnerstein & Barrett, Effects of Erotic Stimuli on Male Aggression Towards Females,

36 J. OF PERSONALITY

AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY

80 (1978); Donnerstein, Donnerstein &

Evans, Erotic Stimuli and Aggression: Facilitationor Inhibition, 32 J. OF
SONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY

PER-

237 (1975).
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those which promote bad values. The third is the problem of overbreadth and underinclusiveness. The statute is not designed in
terms of values but in terms of sexually explicit speech. As a result,
it deters expression which describes or represents the acts set out
by the legislature with little relation to the moral context of the
expression. This is so, at least, if one assumes that the portrayal of
sexual acts can be positive, negative, or neutral depending on the
context. Conversely, under the statute, one may espouse bad valFinally the endeavor to
ues provided one does so artistically.'
censor morally bad ideas is not compatible with the most basic
principles of first amendment law. If the first amendment protects
only expression that the majority believes will promote the right
values, it does not protect much-perhaps not even expression by
minority political parties. As long as certain varieties of sexual intercourse between men and women-possibly even husbands and
wives-are punished as felonies under state law, portrayal of and
advocacy of the acceptability of such activity is, of course, political
expression.
Sexually explicit materials, by their very nature arouse intense
and strongly-held feelings. Questions of sexual expression touch
the deepest roots of our moral sensibilities. Consequently, the reaction of many (as embodied in the recent North Carolina statute) to
the existence and dissemination of sexually explicit materials is
understandable. It is a natural reaction to forbid that which we
abhor. Many of the values proponents of censorship seek to promote deserve general support.
But the danger of broad statutes that forbid sexual expression
to insure suppression of expression we find abhorrent is particularly troubling in a democratic society. The result is that people
will be sent to prison under an act which gives no meaningful notice of the line between acceptable and non-acceptable sexually explicit expression.
The general philosophy of the first amendment is one of toleration for the spoken and printed word. North Carolina has departed from that philosophy in a way that is deeply troubling.

151. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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Appendix
ESCO Community Standards Poll
Summary of Results
Date of Survey:
Methodology:

Guilford County

Forsyth County

November/December 1985
Telephone, random digit
N=351, Weighted N=371

November/December 1985
Telephone, random digit
N=300

1. AGE:
Under 18
18-25
26-35
36-50
51-65
Over 65
No answer
(18 or over)
2. SEX:
Male
Female
3. POLITICAL PARTY:
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Not one of these
categories
Don't know, not sure
No answer

N

Percent

0
64
89
100
72
42

0.0
17.3
24.0
27.0
19.4
11.3

N

Percent
0.0
13.3
18.7
27.7
28.0
12.3
0.0

166
205

44.7
55.3

153
147

51.0
49.0

143
88
77

38.5
23.8
20.8

116
76
42

38.7
25.3
14.0

42
6
15

14.3
1.0
6.7

4. IN YOUR PERSONAL OPINION, DO YOU THINK IT IS
ACCEPTABLE OR NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR ADULTS WHO
WANT TO, TO SEE MOVIES SHOWING OTHER ADULTS IN
ACTUAL OR PRETENDED SEXUAL ACTIVITIES?
N
Percent
N
Percent
Acceptable
Neither
Not acceptable
Don't know
No answer

208
11
139
5
8

56.1
3.0
37.5
1.3
2.2
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5
2

47.0
4.7
46.0
1.7
0.7
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5. IN YOUR PERSONAL OPINION, DO YOU THINK IT IS
ACCEPTABLE OR NOT ACCEPTABLE, FOR ADULTS WHO
WANT TO, TO SEE MAGAZINES AND BOOKS PORTRAYING
OTHER ADULTS IN ACTUAL OR PRETENDED SEXUAL
ACTIVITIES?
Percent
N
N
Percent
Acceptable
Neither
Not acceptable
Don't know
No answer

225

60.6
35.8
.5
1.3

142
11
141
5
0

47.7
3.7
47.0
1.7
0.0

6. IN YOUR OPINION, DO YOU THINK IT IS ACCEPTABLE OR
NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR ADULTS WHO WANT TO, IN THE
PRIVACY OF THEIR HOMES, TO SEE MOVIES SHOWING
OTHER ADULTS IN ACTUAL OR PRETENDED SEXUAL
ACTIVITIES?
Percent
N
N
Percent
Acceptable
Neither
Not acceptable
Don't know
No answer

241
4
118
4
4

65.0
1.1
31.7
1.1
1.1

182
9
102
7
0

60.7
3.0
34.0
2.3
0.0

7. IN YOUR OPINION, DO YOU THINK IT IS ACCEPTABLE OR
NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR ADULTS WHO WANT TO, IN THE
PRIVACY OF THEIR HOMES, TO SEE MAGAZINES AND
BOOKS PORTRAYING OTHER ADULTS IN SITUATIONS
INVOLVING NUDITY AND ACTUAL OR PRETENDED
SEXUAL ACTIVITIES?
N
Percent
N
Percent
Acceptable
Neither
Not acceptable
Don't know
No answer

237
6
120
3
5

63.9
1.6
32.3
.8
1.3

185
9
102
4
0

61.7
3.0
34.0
1.3
0.0

8. IN YOUR OPINION, IS IT ACCEPTABLE OR NOT
ACCEPTABLE, FOR ADULTS WHO WANT TO, TO PURCHASE
MAGAZINES THAT PORTRAY OTHER ADULTS IN ACTUAL
OR PRETENDED SEXUAL ACTIVITIES?
Percent
N
Percent
N
Acceptable
Neither
Not acceptable

219
7
130
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153
6
138
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Don't know
No answer

9
6

2.4
1.6

3
0

1.0
0.0

9. IN YOUR OPINION, IS IT ACCEPTABLE OR NOT
ACCEPTABLE FOR MOVIE THEATERS THAT RESTRICT
ATTENDANCE ONLY TO ADULTS TO SHOW FILMS
PORTRAYING OTHER ADULTS IN ACTUAL OR PRETENDED
SEXUAL ACTIVITIES?
N
Percent
N
Percent
Acceptable
Neither
Not acceptable
Don't know
No answer

207
5
147
5
7

55.8
1.3
39.6
1.3
1.9

161
11
126
2
0

53.7
3.7
42.0
0.7
0.0

10. IN YOUR OPINION, IS IT ACCEPTABLE OR NOT
ACCEPTABLE
FOR
BOOKSTORES
THAT
RESTRICT
ADMITTANCE ONLY TO ADULTS TO SELL PUBLICATIONS
AND EXHIBIT MOVIES PORTRAYING OTHER ADULTS IN
SITUATIONS INVOLVING NUDITY AND ACTUAL OR
PRETENDED SEXUAL ACTIVITIES?
N
Percent
N
Percent
Acceptable
Neither
Not acceptable
Don't know
No answer

209
6
143
8
5

56.3
1.6
38.5
2.2
1.3

I51
9
26
4
0

53.7
3.0
42.0
1.3
0.0

11. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONSES. WE HAVE BEEN
USING THE TERM "SEXUAL ACTIVITIES" IN THIS
INTERVIEW. WHAT WE MEAN B? THIS TERM INCLUDES
ADULTS SHOWN IN TOTAL MALE AND/OR FEMALE
NUDITY,
ACTUAL
OR
PRETENDED
SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE, AND ALL KINDS OF SEXUAL VARIATIONS.
IS THAT WHAT YOU UNDERSTOOD THE TERM TO MEAN,
OR DID YOU THINK WE MEANT SOMETHING ELSE?
N
Percent
N
Percent

Understood
Thought we meant
something else
Don't know
No answer

369

99.5

0
0
2

0.0
0.0
.5
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